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equitable counterclaim. Under Section 1425 of the CPA counterclaims were not permitted in holdover proceedings, although they
were allowed in non-payment of rent cases.
The court found that the restrictive language of Section 1425
of the CPA was not incorporated in Section 743 of the RPAPL,
and held that counterclaims may be interposed in any summary
proceeding whether the proceeding be for non-payment or for
holding over.
Although the desire for quick disposition of landlord and
tenant matters restricts the utilization of counterclaims, the court
noted that "where it is so intertwined with the defense as to
become part and parcel thereof, ' 26 7 the counterclaim should be
entertained in the same proceeding. However, where the counterclaim does not bear upon the question of whether the landlord is
entitled to immediate possession of his property, the counterclaim
should be severed and sent off as a separate action or proceeding.
Thus, a counterclaim for negligence resulting in personal injuries
interposed by the tenant in a summary proceeding should be severed from the proceeding.
MVAIC
Clause in Endorsement Reducing Award Held to Violate Policy
Behind MVAIC
The Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation [hereinafter refered to as MVAIC] was created to provide compensation
for innocent persons injured by an uninsured motorist. 268 The
courts have sought to uphold this broad purpose in a number of
recent decisions.
In Durrant v. MVAIC, 269 petitioner was involved in an accident with an uninsured automobile. He was covered by the New
York Automobile Accident Indemnification endorsement contained
in his employer's policy and hence was an "insured" person under
the MVAIC law.2 7 0 The endorsement contained the standard clause
reducing MVAIC's liability by such workmen's compensation as
may have been received by the insured for the same injuries.
Petitioner filed his claim with MVAIC. The arbitrator refused to
reduce the award by the amount of workmen's compensation received by the petitioner, finding that the Legislature did not intend
that MVAIC should have the power through its right to draw the
26 7

1d. at 812.
N.Y. INS. LAW § 600(2); McCarthy v. MVAIC, 16 App. Div. 2d 35,
38, 224 N.Y.S.2d 909, 912, aff'd, 12 N.Y.2d 922, 188 N.E.2d 405, 238 N.Y.S.
268

2d 101 (1963).

26920 App. Div. 2d 242, 246 N.Y.S.2d 548 (2d Dep't 1964).
270N.Y. INs. LAW § 601(i).
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endorsement 27 ' to reduce the amount of the award. Petitioner
sought to confirm the award. The appellate division, in reversing
the lower court and confirming the arbitrator's award, held that
the Legislature in enacting the MVAIC law intended that all innocent victims of uninsured motorists should receive uniform recoveries and since the MVAIC statute does not reduce the recovery
of "qualified" persons, 27 2 the recoveries of "insured" persons cannot
be so reduced. Moreover, the endorsement is not a private contract between MVAIC and the insured; a supervening public
interest is involved which nullifies a unilateral provision inserted
by MVAIC limiting the insured's recovery.2 73 The case will have
wide implications in view of the fact that the disputed MVAIC
clause involved at bar is virtually identical to the one found in
almost all uninsured motorist endorsements.
Passenger'sRight to Collect Under MVAIC Endorsement Not
Affected by Insured's Failure to Notify Insurer
In Garcia v. MVAIC,27 4 the claimant sustained personal injuries when an automobile in which he was a passenger struck
a wall. At the time of the accident, the vehicle was insured by the
All State Insurance Company, whose policy contained the New
York Automobile Accident Indemnification endorsement. Subsequently, the company disclaimed liability because of the failure of
the owner to notify it of the accident within the allotted time.
Thereafter, the passenger filed a notice of claim with MVAIC as
an "insured person" 275 (the victim of an accident in an uninsured
vehicle) under the MVAIC endorsement.
The MVAIC then
applied for a permanent stay of arbitration, contending that claimant did not have the status of an "insured person" because the
disclaimer by the insurance company rendered the vehicle uninsured, thereby rendering the policy and the endorsement contained
271 N.Y. INs. LAW §§ 167 (2a), 606(b) ; see Matthews v. American Cent.
Ins. Co., 154 N.Y. 449, 456, 48 N.E. 751, 752 (1897).
272 N.Y. Ixs. LAW §§ 601(b), 610.
273 MVAIC also contended that the claimant would get a double recovery
if he were permitted both the workmen's compensation and full MVAIC
awards. The court said that there cannot be a double recovery, because
the claimant's recovery is "subject to the lien of his employer for reimbursement of the sum of the workmen's compensation benefits received." That
is,' the employer, and thereby his workmen's compensation carrier, are in
effect to be given the right of subrogation against MVAIC. The workmen's
compensation carrier is entitled to be reimbursed from the MVAIC proceeds
and not vice versa. But see Commissioners of State Insurance Fund v.
Miller, 4 App. Div. 2d 481, 166 N.Y.S.2d 777 (1st Dep't 1957) (wherein
it was held that the employer's workmen's compensation carrier had no
lien on insurance proceeds received by the employee).
27441 Misc. 2d 858, 246 N.Y.S.2d 841 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
275 N.Y. INs. LAW § 601(i).

